Treatment Versus Regime Effects of Carrots and Sticks by Arni, Patrick P et al.
                          Arni, P. P., van den Berg, G. J., & Lalive, R. (2020). Treatment Versus




Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/07350015.2020.1784744
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via
American Statistical Association at https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.2020.1784744 . Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/red/research-policy/pure/user-guides/ebr-terms/
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ubes20
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
ISSN: 0735-0015 (Print) 1537-2707 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ubes20
Treatment versus regime effects of carrots and
sticks
Patrick Arni, Gerard J. van den Berg & Rafael Lalive
To cite this article: Patrick Arni, Gerard J. van den Berg & Rafael Lalive (2020): Treatment
versus regime effects of carrots and sticks, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, DOI:
10.1080/07350015.2020.1784744
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.2020.1784744
Accepted author version posted online: 25
Jun 2020.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 15
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
 
Treatment versus regime effects of carrots and 
sticks 
 
Patrick Arni1, Gerard J. van den Berg1, Rafael Lalive2,* 
1University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
2University of Lausanne, Batiment Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
*We are grateful to the Editor Rajeev Dehejia, an anonymous Associate 
Editor, two anonymous Referees, Olof Åslund, Gregory Jolivet, Pedro Martins, 
Knut Røed, Jan van Ours, Ingrid Waernbaum and several seminar audiences 
for their comments. We thank Michael Lechner and the Swiss Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs, especially Jonathan Gast, and the Caisse Centrale de 
Compensation, especially David Sanchez, for their help with data and for 
useful comments. Jeremy Zuchuat provided excellent research assistance for 
the revised version. 
Patrick Arni is also affiliated to IZA, CESifo, CAFE and DE (University of 
Lausanne), patrick.arni@bristol.ac.uk. 
Gerard van den Berg, gerard.vandenberg@bristol.ac.uk, is also affiliated to 
the University of Groningen, IFAU, IZA, ZEW, CESifo and CEPR. 
Rafael Lalive acknowledges support by the National Center for Competence 
in Research LIVES. He is also affiliated to CESifo, CEPR, IFAU and IZA. 
 
Corresponding author Rafael Lalive rafael.lalive@unil.ch 
Abstract: 
Public Employment Service (PES) agencies and caseworkers (CW) often 
have substantial leeway in the design and implementation of active labor 
market policies (ALMP) for the unemployed, and they use policies to a varying 










outcomes through different policy intensities. These operate potentially on all 
forward-looking job seekers regardless of actual treatment exposure. We 
consider regime effects for two sets of programs, supporting (“carrots”) and 
restricting (“sticks”) programs, and contrast regime and treatment effects on 
unemployment durations, employment, and post-unemployment earnings 
using register data that contain PES and caseworker identifiers for about 
130,000 job spells. Regime effects are important: earnings are higher in a 
PES if carrot-type programs are used more intensively and stick-type 
programs are used less intensively. Actual treatment effects on earnings have 
a similar order of magnitude as regime effects and are positive for 
participation in carrot-type programs and negative for stick-type treatments. 
Regime effects are economically substantial. A modest increase in the 
intended usage of carrots and sticks reduces the total cost of an unemployed 
individual by up to 7.5%. 
JEL Codes: J65, J68, J64 
Keywords: active labor market programs, policy regime, treatment effect, 
employment, earnings, unemployment, caseworkers. 
1 Introduction 
Active labor market policies (ALMP) are important tools to fight unemployment 
and to improve the matching of workers and jobs in labor markets. Several 
OECD countries spend more than one percent of their GDP on ALMP. The 
existing literature has documented the effects of specific policy interventions 
on participants, see e.g. Card et al. (2010, 2017). But, interestingly, not much 
evidence can be found in the literature about the role of Public Employment 
Service (PES) units and caseworkers (CW) as policy makers. PES often apply 
mixtures of policies. Within PES, CW often have substantial leeway in dealing 
with their clients. Indeed, the frequency with which individuals are exposed to 
policies may vary substantially across PES and local labor markets. 
This paper discusses the effects of PES and CW policy regimes on job 










capture policy regimes as the intended use of a particular policy or program 
by a caseworker or PES unit that can not be explained by job seeker 
characteristics. Policy regimes affect job search strategies of potentially all job 
seekers. Job seekers who see that caseworkers tend to monitor strictly and 
tend to issue benefit sanctions frequently in the local public employment 
service may think twice about failing to send the required job applications. As 
a result of such a strict regime, potentially all job seekers search more 
intensely and/or have lower reservation wages. Training programs may exert 
a regime effect as well, although its sign is arguably ambiguous. Job seekers 
may find training attractive and reduce their job search intensity to improve 
the chances of attending training. Conversely, an intense training policy 
regime may provide a fertile environment for job seekers to know how to 
better find jobs. Determining the size and direction of policy regime effects is 
the object of our empirical investigation. 
We estimate regime effects based on observed policy usage and on register 
data with PES and CW identifiers. We distinguish between programs with a 
supportive nature (“carrots”) and policies that constrain individual behavior (“
sticks”).1 The first group of policies is taken to cover training and job search 
assistance, and the second group to cover benefit sanctions and workfare 
programs. We observe how frequently the different PES and CW use these 
policies. To reconstruct intended policies from actual (observed) program 
participation or treatment exposure, we apply a competing risks approach that 
is ideally suited to our context where PES and CW determine ALMP 
assignment. The competing risks analysis enables us to measure ALMP 
exposures in a setting where the subsequent individual treatment status is not 
yet observed at entry into unemployment and where individuals can leave 
unemployment before being exposed at all. In a second step, we assess the 
relation between CW- and PES-specific intended policies and actual 
treatments on the one hand, and realized individual earnings and employment 
in the years after unemployment on the other hand. Thus, we examine 
medium to long run outcomes. The effects of these policies are assessed both 










We jointly assess the relative importance of different kinds and types of ALMP 
effects. The effects of a “sticks” policy regime might depend on whether a “
carrots” policy is present or not because job seekers are likely to face a 
second treatment after the first one. The presence of an intensive supporting 
carrots regime might lead job seekers to feel that the sticks policy is less of a 
threat, so that the threat effect of sticks policies may be lower if used in 
combination with carrots policies. Carrots policy regimes, on the other hand, 
might need to go one-for-one with sticks policy regimes. For instance, a PES 
that places many job seekers into training might want to enforce a rigorous 
adherence with job search requirements. Our empirical strategy allows us to 
directly identify the contributions of specific policy makers (PES and CW). 
Note that ignoring the effects and interplays of policy regimes means ignoring 
a potentially non-negligible part of the over-all ALMP effects – and thus means 
ignoring the role of the policy makers and policy implementers in UI systems. 
In our empirical analysis we use a rich base of register data from Switzerland. 
Switzerland provides an especially useful setting for analyzing the role of 
policy regimes. The PES enjoy a large leeway to forge their specific strategy 
in implementing the different types of policy (i.e., including what we refer to as 
carrots and sticks). As a rule, job seekers are assigned to CW based on 
exogenous and pre-determined characteristics (last name, industry, etc.). 
Conditional on these characteristics, assignment to CW is plausibly random. 
For PES policies, we analyze outcomes within labor market regions. The latter 
have been created originally to cover travel-to-work areas and represent local 
labor markets. As our baseline sample, we take a fourth of the complete 
inflow of men into registered (full-time) unemployment in Switzerland in the 
years 2000 to 2005, up to age 61.2 This covers over 150 different PES and 
700 CW. The unemployment insurance database provides a large amount of 
socio-demographic and benefit-entitlement-related information. To this base 
we merged a further database that covers the (daily) history of all ALMP 
events, including sanctions. Finally, to observe the outcome and the past 










covers (non-)employment and earnings in the six years before and up to 42 
months after unemployment entry. 
Policy regime effects can be seen as a generalization of the concept of ex 
ante effects of possible future treatments on not-yet-treated individuals. Ex 
ante effects are generated by individuals being concerned about future 
treatments. When deciding about their behavior before a treatments arises, it 
is optimal for them to take into account that there is a rate at which they will 
be exposed to a treatment and its subsequent effects. Regime effects do not 
only capture ex ante effects before a first treatment, but they may also apply 
after a treatment has occurred, in anticipation of subsequent treatments and 
interactions with the PES or CW. Indeed, they may capture a general 
comprehensive guidance approach of the PES and CW towards their clients, 
over and beyond the assignment of treatments. For example, higher 
intensities of support or constraint may stretch beyond treatment assignment, 
towards a high degree of helpfulness or towards a highly controlling attitude, 
and each of these may be reciprocated in the job seeker’s behavior. Regime 
effects may also include information spillover effects regarding policy 
intentions. Policy regimes as well as ex ante effects are related to equilibrium 
effects through changes in labor demand and labor supply and their 
composition.3 However, at the CW level (that is, when capturing CW effects in 
deviation of the corresponding PES level), no equilibrium effects should be 
expected, and it is even highly questionable whether PES areas are 
sufficiently large to induce such effects. 
Our empirical analysis does not provide final answers on what are driving 
forces behind the estimated regime effects (although we use external data 
sources to rule out that caseworker personality and the PES corporate style 
are critical). In this sense it is interesting to briefly examine findings in the 
existing empirical literature on ex ante effects. For job search assistance 
programs, these are analyzed in, for example, Blundell et al. (2004) and 
van den Berg et al. (2015). For training programs they are analyzed in 
van den Berg et al. (2009). The former studies exploit the national introduction 










newly unemployed workers about the rate at which future treatments take 
place. Ex ante effects of sticks policies have been analyzed in studies of 
policies in which the compliance to job search directives for unemployment 
benefits recipients is monitored. A relevant study is Rosholm and 
Svarer (2008) who examine ex ante threat effects of activation policies by 
allowing the transition rate to work to depend on the transition rate to ALMPs, 
which are simultaneously estimated. We discuss their study in more detail in 
Section 4.4 The studies generally find evidence of what may be called ex ante 
attraction: individuals who expect participation in a supporting program may 
reduce search intensity before the treatment and become more selective in 
terms of the jobs they accept, whereas for constraining programs this is 
reversed. Of course, even as a study of ex ante effects, our study goes 
beyond this literature in that we simultaneously consider different treatment 
types and their interaction effects. 
A few studies in the literature on the treatment effects of ALMPs jointly 
estimate effects of different treatments and their interactions. In this subset of 
the literature, even fewer consider a contrast between supporting and 
restricting programs. van der Klaauw and van Ours (2013) is an exception, 
studying the effect of both re-employment bonuses and benefit sanctions on 
the re-employment chances of welfare recipients. Also, van den Berg 
et al. (2010) show that newly unemployed workers report widely different 
subjective probabilities of future participation in training programs and in 
workfare, and that this is reflected in their job search behavior.5 
Yet another related branch of literature studies CW-driven effects on 
unemployed individuals’ outcomes. These effects, captured by activities like 
counseling or monitoring, appear to be substantial. For a recent overview of 
the evidence, see Rosholm (2014). This literature, however, does not directly 
assess the contribution of the CW to the estimated treatment effects (due to 
missing CW identifiers). In addition to this, there is evidence that CW do use 
their discretionary power, in that the variation in CW-induced ALMP 
assignments is substantial across caseworkers after correction for worker 










an analogy to the effect of physician-specific effects on sickness absence; see 
Markussen and Røgeberg (2013). Huber et al. (2017) use mediation analysis 
to study the roles of various facets of caseworker personality in the evaluation 
of labor market outcomes.6 
The next section provides information on the institutional background of the 
empirical analysis, in Switzerland during our observation window. Section 3 
presents the data and provides a descriptive analysis.7 Section 4 presents the 
empirical approach to estimating policy regimes and discusses identification 
of the main parameters. We pay particular attention to the issue that 
individuals may influence the (latent) rate at which certain “sticks” treatments 
arrive. We also examine whether a relation exists between caseworker policy 
regimes on the one hand and the personality of the caseworker in his 
behavior towards clients on the other hand, since in the current study we are 
interested in the former but not in the latter. Here, as in other parts of the 
paper, we exploit insights from in-depth survey interviews held among 
caseworkers and PES offices. Section 5 provides a descriptive analysis of the 
measured policy regimes. Section 6 presents the main results. Here we also 
study various interaction effects between policies, and we provide a 
comprehensive cost-benefits analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background 
The entitlement duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in 
Switzerland is 400 days for individuals who meet the contribution and 
employability requirements. From age 55 onwards, benefits are extended by 
an additional 120 days. The replacement ratio is 80%; however, it is 70 % for 
those who earned more than CHF 4030 per month prior to unemployment and 
who are not caring for children.8 Job seekers have to pay all earnings and 
social insurance taxes except the UI tax rate (which stands at about 2%). This 
means that the gross replacement rate is close to the net replacement rate. 
After the entitlement period, the unemployed have to rely on social 










unemployment benefits for an individual who is single and has no other 
sources of earnings. 
Enrollment in UI has two requirements. First, the individual must have paid UI 
taxes for at least twelve months in the two years prior to registering at the 
public employment service (PES). Job seekers entering the labor market are 
exempted from the contribution requirement if they have been in school, in 
prison, employed outside of Switzerland or have been taking care of children. 
Second, job seekers must possess the capability to fulfill the requirements of 
a regular job - they must be “employable”. If a job seeker is found not to be 
employable there is the possibility to collect social assistance. 
The entitlement criteria during the unemployment spell concern job search 
requirements and participation in active labor market programs. Job seekers 
are obliged to make a minimum number of applications to “suitable” jobs each 
month9 and they are obliged to participate in active labor market programs 
during the unemployment spell.10 Compliance with the job search and 
program participation requirements is monitored by roughly 2500 caseworkers 
at 150 PES offices. When individuals register at the PES office, they are 
assigned to a caseworker on the basis of either previous industry, previous 
occupation, place of residence, alphabetically or the caseworker’s availability. 
Job seekers have to meet at least once a month with the caseworker. 
Caseworkers monitor job search by checking that job seekers fill in the details 
of the jobs to which they have applied (monthly protocol of applications) and 
by asking them to present the sent applications at the meetings. Job seekers 
are typically required to apply to about 8 to 10 jobs per month. Participation in 
a labor market program is monitored by the caseworker because program 
suppliers only get paid for the actual number of days a job seeker attends the 
program. Moreover, non-participation is subject to sanctions as well (Lalive 
et al., 2005; Arni et al., 2013). 
There is remarkable discretion in how often labor market programs and 
sanctions are used across PES. The authorities at the level of the canton and, 










which rules are followed and guidelines are applied. With respect to 
sanctions, caseworkers may adjust, to some degree, the target number of 
required applications and the monitoring intensity. Caseworkers count the 
number of new applications in all cases and they may also check up on the 
applications claimed by job seekers. In the case of labor market programs, 
caseworkers dispose of some discretion in the assignment decision, with 
respect to participation, choice of program type and timing (Behncke 
et al., 2010a). 
The Swiss labor market policy distinguishes between four types of policy 
treatments: (i) Human capital training programs (this includes, as the mostly 
used sub-category, job search assistance programs); (ii) workfare programs 
(within public or non-profit institutions); (iii) subsidized temporary employment 
(during the unemployment spell); (iv) sanctions. 
In this paper, we regroup these into two distinctive program types: carrots and 
sticks. The first group, supporting programs, comprise all kinds of training and 
job search assistance, thus type (i). The second group, restricting programs, 
aggregates sanctions and workfare programs, thus types (ii) and (iv). The 
reason why we consider workfare programs first and foremost as sticks is that 
they are broadly disliked by the job seekers. Thus, they try to avoid them – for 
reasons of stigmatization and fear to be “locked in” into these programs over 
the longer period – by not proposing them to caseworkers. The above-
mentioned survey by Behncke et al. (2010a) provides evidence that supports 
this interpretation. Restricting programs are mainly sanctions (80% on 
average), so effects of restricting programs are most likely generated by their 
sanction component, not the workfare component. We do not explicitly model 
subsidized temporary employment, treatment (iii), because job seekers 
choose the subsidized jobs by themselves, so caseworkers do not have much 
discretional choice in this respect. Also, job seekers with subsidized 
employment remain eligible for carrot and stick programs.11 










Our analysis uses data from two sources. The unemployment insurance 
register contains administrative information on all spells of registered 
joblessness. For our sample we extract all the spells that started between July 
2000 and June 2005 for job seekers who were 61.5 years old or less when 
they registered at the PES. This data records unemployment duration: this is 
the number of days a job seeker is registered with the local PES. Note that 
unemployment duration can deviate from days on unemployment benefits. 
Individuals may register with the PES before they lost their job. Job seekers 
may, in principle, also de-register before they start on the new job. 
Unemployment duration is still a useful concept for our analysis since job 
seekers need to be registered to follow ALMPs. The data also contain detailed 
information on the timing of ALMP participation and benefit sanctions events 
in daily precision. The data informs on where job seekers live, which PES is in 
charge of the job seeker, and also information on the caseworker in charge. 
Usually, caseworker assignments are fix over the course of the 
unemployment spell but there are exceptions12. We focus on the caseworker 
initially assigned to the individual. We have detailed information on socio-
demographics, employability, occupation, benefit variables, household size, 
and whether a person has filed an application for disability insurance benefits. 
Our second data source is social security register data. This data covers a 25 
% random sample of all workers between 1982 to 2008. The data provide 
information on employment and earnings for every month between 1982 and 
2008. We use this data source to construct 5 years of pre-unemployment 
history for every spell of joblessness. We also use it to construct our main 
outcome variables. We look at real monthly employment earnings in the 
period of 3.5 years after leaving unemployment. We also separately record 
the number of months a job seeker has been employed, and the average 
earnings during the employment months during the 3.5 year post-
unemployment period. This allows us to decompose earnings into an 
employment and into earnings while employed component. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the key variables for our main 









61.5 years (91,705 individuals).13 In our analysis, we focus on the first 
treatment that job seekers receive during their unemployment spell. About 22 
% of all job seekers enter a supporting program, and 19% of all job seekers 
are receive a restricting treatment. The median time until the supporting 
program starts is 97 days. Restricting treatments begin somewhat earlier, 
after 71 days.14 Most job seekers are either married (46 %) or single (45 %), 
and fewer ones are divorced or widowed (proportion not shown). A substantial 
proportion of job seekers in our data have completed a 4 year vocational 
training after compulsory schooling (50%). The second most important 
educational attainment is compulsory schooling (28%). Relevant proportions 
of job seekers have either completed a short vocational training of 2 years 
(9%) or a tertiary degree (10 %). Male job seekers typically work as blue collar 
factory workers (13%), construction workers (13 %), or in the restaurants or 
cleaning sector (13 %). Descriptive statistics also show information on 
employability, a caseworker assessment of the chances the job seeker will 
find work. Most job seekers have medium employability indicating no large 
problems with job placement (72%), but a sizeable proportion also have low 
employability (15 %) as well as excellent employability (13 %, not shown in 
table). Job seekers are 36 years old on average, on average living with 2.16 
persons in a household. About 42 % of all job seekers do not have Swiss 
nationality, and 39 % do not speak the local language as their mother tongue. 
The median unemployment duration in our sample is 144 days. We measure 
unemployment as the number of days between registering at the PES agency 
until de-registering from the PES. This is the period during which job seekers 
in Switzerland have access to active labor market programs (regardless of 
their current employment status). 
Figure 1A shows the empirical exit rate from unemployment, i.e. de-
registrations from the PES. Job seekers leave unemployment initially at a rate 
of 10 percent per month. The transition rate then increases, peaks at 15 
percent per month after 3 months of unemployment, and gradually decreases 
to 7 percent per month after 18 months of unemployment. Benefits end for 










increase in the transition rate out of unemployment shortly before the 
expiration of benefits entitlements. 
Figure 1B shows the empirical transition rate from unemployment to a 
supporting program. In the beginning of the unemployment spell, just short of 
4 percent of all job seekers start a supporting program. The probability of 
entering a supporting program then increases to a maximum of 7 percent per 
month, and it decreases gradually to a level just above 1 percent after 22 
months. The transition rate to restricting programs follows a fairly similar 
pattern, but it is substantially below that of supporting programs throughout 
the unemployment spell. Note that the duration dependence of all transition 
rates that we show in Figure 1 might be spurious as we do not control for 
heterogeneity in these plots. 
We now turn to discussing employment and earnings measures. Figure 2 
shows earnings and employment paths for the job seekers in our estimation 
sample, relative to the calendar date of PES registration, which is normalized 
to zero on the horizontal axis. “Earnings for employed workers” represent 
average earnings among individuals who are employed during a month. 
Employment is the proportion of individuals in our sample who hold a job in a 
month. These two measures can be combined into our total average-
population “earnings” measure. In employment, these “earnings” are taken to 
equal to actual earnings whereas in non-employment they are set to zero. The 
total “earnings” measure can decrease for a number of reasons: either 
employed workers are paid less, or fewer individuals hold a job, or both. 
Total average“earnings” increase somewhat before the unemployment and 
decrease sharply upon entering unemployment.15 Note that they do not 
reduce to zero. There are two reasons for this. First, a substantial proportion 
of job seekers register at the PES even before losing their job. Secondly, very 
short unemployment durations may lead to non-zero earnings in the months 
on or right after the unemployment registration. By construction, the average “










Unemployment does not reduce earnings compared to the pre-unemployment 
level. 
Figure 2B shows employment. Most job seekers are employed before 
registering at the PES, even though the employment rate is far from 100 % in 
the month prior registering. The employment rate then decreases substantially 
but does not reach zero in the month when job seekers register at the PES. 
Again, this shows that entering our state of “PES-registration” unemployment 
and leaving a job are not necessarily concurrent. The employment rate 
increases rapidly over the first 10 months after the onset of the spell. 
4 Conceptual Framework 
In this section we explain the methodology and we show how its key 
assumptions are justified by the institutional setting of the Swiss labor market. 
4.1 Variation in policy regimes 
We capture policy regimes as the intended intensity of use of a program. 
Policy regimes therefore refer to the speed or frequency at which a decision 
maker aims to use a particular policy instrument, e.g. training programs, over 
and above the frequency of use indicated by the characteristics of the job 
seeker. In Switzerland, policy regimes may vary across PES offices and 
across caseworkers. They may vary at the PES level because this is the de 
facto unit that implements the procedures leading to policy regimes. A 2003 
survey among 98 heads of PES shows to what extent PES directors are 
managed by the canton, and how strictly they manage their caseworkers 
(Table 2). Of course, heads of PES are not completely free in their work, and 
most of them do not let their caseworkers do as they please. However, more 
than half of the heads of PES only receive rough guidelines and are free to 
define their strategies within those guidelines. A similar proportion sets only 
rough guidelines for caseworkers and lets them choose freely within those 
guidelines. Our empirical approach will exploit exactly this within-canton and 
within-PES leeway to estimate policy regime effects. 










Actual usage of the program does not necessarily provide an accurate 
description of intended usage, for two reasons. First of all, an individual may 
leave unemployment before participating in the program. Secondly, regimes 
may include ex ante effects which, depending on the policy, may allow 
individuals to influence the actual usage of the treatment themselves. We now 
describe in turn how we deal with these issues. 
Competing risks. 
The first issue can be dealt with by invoking duration analysis with competing 
risks. Let tu, tc and ts denote the time (in unemployment) until de-registering 
from the PES, participation in a carrot ALMP, and exposure to a sticks policy 
treatment, respectively. Next, let tp denote the duration until the first event in 
the unemployment spell. The latter follows a competing-risks process: 
min( , , )p s c ut t t t . We define the corresponding treatment dummies as follows: 
Dc = 1 if tp = tc, and Ds = 1 if tp = ts. 
Our operationalization of the intended policies by PES and by CW is based on 
the hazard rates of the latent durations tc and ts, respectively, for each PES 
and for each CW, adjusted for individual characteristics x and for the elapsed 
unemployment durations at the moment of treatment. For ,p s c  we adopt 










PES CW PES PES




p k k p p m p
k
t x D D Y m t x D
D Y 
    










Here, t is the elapsed duration of unemployment. PES is the public 
employment service, and PESjD  are a full set of dummies that identify the PES 
for each individual. CW is the caseworker, and CWkD  refers to a full set of 
dummies that identify caseworkers. The η coefficients constitute a set of half-
yearly inflow cohort fixed effects (where τ denotes calendar time at the 
moment of inflow), Y – is a series of variables that controls for the earnings 










time intervals/parameters), and μ constitutes a set of labor-market-region 
fixed effects (where m denotes the region). To demarcate units for these 
spatial fixed effects, we use the 106 commuting zones constructed by the 
Swiss authorities to capture local labor markets. These zones are usually 
called Mobilité Spatiale regions (in short, MS regions). These do not coincide 
with PES. In our data, there are on average 4.6 PES per MS, with a standard 
deviation of 2.9. In cities constituting one MS there may be a considerable 
number of PES. For example, the metropolitan areas of Geneva and Zürich 
contain 11 and 8 PES, respectively. Notice that if PES regime effects are 
assumed absent, we may use the PES as the relevant spatial unit for the 
spatial fixed effect. 
The model (1) assumes that policies are stable in time. We have probed the 
stability of regime effects by ranking caseworkers and PES units with respect 
to the rate at which they use carrots and sticks. We find that PES and 
caseworkers use the policy tools in ways that places many of them at a similar 
rank from one year to the next.16 So policy regimes appear, on the whole, 
stable over the time horizon we analyze. 
Before estimation, we normalize caseworker effects by defining them in 
deviation from the PES mean effect. This means that the PES effect captures 
the PES policy regime including the average effects of its caseworkers. 
Caseworker mobility across PES would enable the separate identification of 
the PES regime effect and the average effect of the composition of the PES 
team of caseworkers. However, such mobility is sparse in our observation 
window, and we would have to restrict the analysis to a tiny fraction of the set 
of PES. We therefore proceed by not imposing the constraint that the 
caseworker effects of caseworkers moving between PES is identical across 
PES.17 We also transform the PES effects as deviations from the mean of the 
MS region and MS effects as deviations from the economy-wide mean. The 











In the absence of systematic unobserved heterogeneity, the above hazard 
rates θc and θs can be estimated in isolation from each other. Specifically, the 
competing-risks approach treats all tp spells that end in an event that differs 
from participation in the program of interest as independent right-censoring of 
the time to participation in that program.18 , 19 Notice that this is not related to 
the existence of a policy (regime) effect of θc and θs on tu. 
Next, for each individual with a given x and a given PES and CW, we can 
estimate individual probabilities that a treatment event occurs within two years 
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and analogously for Fs, with θc and θs specified as in equations (1). As 
explained by e.g. Van den Berg (2001), the signs and relative magnitudes of 
the estimated covariate effects on (one minus) the survival probability are 
robust with respect to the omission of unobserved heterogeneity, whereas this 
does not always apply to the covariate effects on the hazard rates. This is one 
reason to prefer Fc and Fs over θc and θs as regime indicators. A second 
reason is that Fc and Fs naturally cover a time interval whereas θc and θs 
assume different values at different elapsed durations. 
Influencing the treatment rates. 
We now turn to the second issue mentioned at the beginning of this 
subsection, namely that job seekers may ex ante influence the rate at which 
they are treated in response to the perceived policy regime. In that case the 
competing-risks hazard rates θc and θs depend both on the regime and on the 
reaction to the regime, so that they may not fully characterize the intended 
policy intensity anymore. With supporting (carrot) policies this is not likely. If 
the corresponding treatments are deemed attractive then their supply will 
always be rationed by the administrative unit. Even if individuals can influence 
the rate at which they participate in a carrots program, the ranking of the 
estimated latent hazard θc across PES (or CW) will probably not revert the 










based on this hazard should still reflect the ranking of intended usage. As a 
result, the effects of the indicators we constructed are still informative on the 
effects of the intended usage. 
With restricting (sticks) policies such as workfare, a similar line of reasoning 
can be applied. However, with sanctions, the individuals have a much 
stronger influence on the occurrence of the treatment. As a result, the effect of 
the strictness of the policy regime on the sanction rate (i.e., on the rate that is 
estimated in the competing risks analysis) may be non-monotonic. To see 
this, consider a policy where individuals’ search effort s is stipulated to meet 
or exceed a lower threshold value *s . Individuals suspected to violate this rule 
are monitored at the rate p0, and if it is detected that 
*s s  then a sanction is 
imposed.22 The strictness of the policy regime is then p0 whereas the sanction 
rate is *
0·I( )p s s . The former is the quantity of interest whereas the latter is 
obtained from the competing risks analysis (it equals θs in the absence of 
other sticks policies). Clearly, if 0 0p   then both of these are equal to zero. If 
p0 increases then the fraction of individuals with 
*s s  will decrease because 
of the strategic ex ante reaction, but the actual sanction rate will then typically 
be positive. However, if 0p   then each violation leads to a punishment. If 
the punishment is sufficiently large then each individual will choose s such 
that *s s . Thus, the policy-regime strictness goes to infinity but the sanction 
rate goes to zero. As a result, an estimated sanction rate of zero is compatible 
both with a very lax regime and with a very strict regime. This means that the 
estimate of θs is not informative of the intended policy, unless we restrict 
attention to low to moderate levels of the intended usage and/or sanctions 
only constitute a minor fraction of the total package of sticks policies. These 
conditions are met in our setting. 
4.3 Effects on outcomes 
Outcome equations. 
We are interested in measuring how policy regimes affect the unemployment 










Concerning the former we estimate the following specification for the 
unemployment exit hazard 

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whereby the notation is as in the previous subsection. Note that we exploit 
past earnings information to control for employment-related selective 
differences between the individuals. Also note that the treatment dummies D 
are now time-varying, to distinguish between the time before and after 
treatment. In subsequent analysis we also allow for interaction effects 
between the various policy regime indicators.23 
Similar to the above equation, the effects of policy regimes and treatments on 
earnings and employment after the unemployment spell ended are modelled 
as follows: 
, , , , ,
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Y can represent different post-unemployment outcomes (over a time window 
of 3.5 years), such as average monthly earnings or employment probabilities 
(i.e. employment stability measures). The above equation is the key outcome 
equation. We control for the completed24 unemployment duration tu in 
polynomial form to isolate the effect of regimes on earnings that arises 
directly, i.e. without changing unemployment duration. We include past 
earnings to address the “pre-program earnings dip” (Ashenfelter, 1978) 
pattern in earnings, i.e. job seekers’ earnings rapidly deteriorate before 
entering unemployment, but recover after starting the unemployment spell. 
Also note that, jointly, the analyses of employment and of earnings while 
employed entail a decomposition of the total effect on post-unemployment 
earnings. 










Since the equations to be estimated are regression-like specifications without 
complex error structures, all model parameters are identified provided that 
regressors are not perfectly correlated to each other. However, it is interesting 
to discuss the key assumptions that underlie the identification of the causal 
effects of interest from the regression specifications.25 
First, notice that to identify the causal effects of attending a particular program 
and the causal regime effects, we make conditional independence 
assumptions (CIA). To this purpose it is important to point out that our data 
contain a wide range of individual summary measures of earnings histories 
and covariates, notably those that are seen as forming the information set of 
the institutions deciding on treatment plans (education, age, past occupation, 
function and unemployment, language skills, benefit conditions, etc.)26. In this 
sense our approach follows the large range of evaluation studies with Swiss 
labor market data (see the references in the introduction).27 The outcome 
equations include treatment and regime effects within the same equation, so 
regime effects are identified conditional on treatments and vice versa. 
Obviously, this means that inference on regime effects and treatment effects 
requires less assumptions than in the case where only treatment effects or 
only regime effects are analyzed. For example, our treatment effect estimates 
control for the fact that the caseworker may influence both the individual 
treatment status and the outcome of interest, where the latter channel runs 
through the policy regime imposed by the caseworker. 
To further justify the CIA underlying the identification of causal caseworker 
regime effects we examine how job seekers are allocated to caseworkers. 
The Behncke et al. (2010a) survey provides information on this (multiple 
answers are possible): 24 % of all caseworkers indicate that their clients are 
assigned randomly, 50% by industry, 55% by occupation, 44% by workload.28 
Hence, random or quasi-random assignment of regimes appears plausible. 
There is a thin line between the CW policy regime and what we might call the 
“caseworker style”. Caseworkers may differ in terms of their personality and 










much empathy they feel for them etc. Such a caseworker style may be 
correlated with the caseworker’s ALMP assignment policy. The interpretation 
of our regime effect estimates depends on this. If caseworker style is 
important and correlated to our regime indicators then the estimates at least 
partly reflect how the CW interact with job seekers on a daily basis. Behncke 
et al. (2010b) show that caseworkers differ in their attitudes to their work: 
some see it as their prime task to help their client, some focus on controlling 
their clients, and not all think that all this matters for job search success. We 
further assess this issue using the Behncke et al. (2010a) survey. We first 
construct a measure of how important each caseworker believes restricting or 
supporting policies are.29 We then correlate the importance of supporting and 
restricting programs with caseworker style. We find absolutely no correlation 
with supporting policies (correlation coefficient –0.0234) and a small, positive, 
correlation with restricting policies (correlation 0.1345). Thus, we feel 
confident that caseworker style does not drive our results.30 
Identification of PES regime effects requires a CIA (within MS region) of PES 
regime with respect to outcomes. This assumption appears plausible as job 
seekers can not choose which PES takes care of them, so endogenous 
mobility between PES is not an issue. We can not rule out that “PES style” 
plays a role. But our data cover a very wide range of activities that feed into 
the job search process. We are likely to capture most of these activities. 
Moreover, we discuss below that the two key activities of a PES, assignment 
to restricting programs and assignment to supporting programs, are virtually 
unrelated. Orthogonality between these two key policy dimensions bolsters 
our confidence in our assumption of orthogonality with respect to other 
unmeasured dimensions. 
Identifying treatment effects further requires the assumption of “no anticipation
” (NA) (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). In words, potential outcomes should 
not depend on the moment at which future treatments are realized, any more 
than what is captured in the model specification. Notice that NA does not 
preclude regime effects. It rules out that individuals have and use more 










in the model specification. Precisely because we allow for heterogeneous 
regime effects, the NA assumption is less restrictive in our setting than is 
usually the case. After all, the actual regime is likely to predict the speed at 
which a treatment takes place. NA is justified for Swiss ALMP, as the time 
between the knowledge that a decision is made to assign a program or a 
sanction, and its realization, is usually shorter than two weeks (Lalive 
et al., 2005, 2008). 
We finish this subsection by comparing our methodology to Rosholm and 
Svarer (2008) who developed an innovative approach to estimate ex ante 
threat effects of ALMP. They restrict attention to activation policies. 
Specifically, they estimate a multivariate duration model, for the duration until 
an activation program and the unemployment duration, controlling for 
selection on unobservables by way of a random effects specification. In 
addition, they include the transition rate to ALMPs as an explanatory variable 
for exit out of unemployment, in order to capture the ex ante threat effect of 
activation programs on the exit out of unemployment. This resembles the role 
of the “carrots” regime indicator Fc as a regressor in θu. Identification relies on 
the requirement that the covariates in (a function of) θc and the other 
covariates in θu do not act additively in θu. This contrasts to our approach in 
which we exploit caseworker and PES identifiers to characterize the policy 
regime. 
5 Descriptive Analysis of Policy Regimes 
To gauge the variation in the actual usage of the “carrots” and “sticks” policies 
and the variation in estimated policy regime intensities, as well as their 
interrelations, this section provides some descriptive statistics. The observed 
frequency of usage of a policy (or the “observed intensity”) is measured by the 
frequency of imposition of at least one treatment of the respective program 
type within a spell of unemployment. On average we observe that one in 
every five individuals (0.22) is subject to a training or job search assistance 










to join a workfare program during unemployment. This is true both for PES 
and for caseworker regimes (Table 3). 
Not surprisingly, the policy regime intensities (or “intended policy intensities”) 
as estimated in Subsection 4.2 are substantially higher. About three job 
seekers out of five (0.58) would enter a supporting program within two years if 
there is no possibility to leave unemployment or to be confronted with a 
restricting program. Likewise, about one in two job seekers (0.53) would face 
a restricting program according to the intended policy regime. The standard 
deviation of the intended policy intensity is also substantially larger than the 
standard deviation of the observed intensity. 
Figure 3 plots intended vs observed intensities across PES.31 Intended policy 
intensities are always larger than observed policy intensities. If this were not 
the case for some PES then this would signify a model specification problem 
in the sense that the specifications of θs or θc are too restrictive. The 
discrepancy between observed and intended intensities tends to be especially 
important for extreme regimes, i.e. those that intend to place everyone to a 
supporting or to a restricting treatment. 
The fact that actual and intended policy usage are not perfectly related is 
important for at least two reasons. First, it means that discarding the 
competing risks analysis and instead using actual observed intensities would 
lead to biased effects. Secondly, since PES equilibrium effects are captured 
by actual usage by PES rather than intended usage by PES, it follows that our 
intended PES policy regime intensities are not synonymous to PES 
equilibrium effects. 
We are also interested in the degree of concurrence of restricting and 
supporting policies. Figure 4A reports the variation of policy mixes, i.e. 
combinations of carrots and sticks policy intensities. The actual observed 
policy mixes broadly cover the two-dimensional policy space in the ranges 










variation to support its exploitation in our estimation strategy. Figure 4B shows 
the corresponding results for policies at the caseworker level. 
Figure 4 also displays the absence of a correlation between carrot and stick 
policy regime intensities. This could mean that PES regime for one policy is 
determined in isolation of the regime for the other policy. Somewhat 
speculatively, one might say that this is consistent with the maintained 
hypothesis that “PES style” is not driving our results. After all, if PES were 
planning their comprehensive policy regime mix it seems plausible to observe 
a correlation between the intensities of the regimes. 
6 Results 
6.1 Baseline estimation results 
Effects on earnings. 
Table 4 reports results on earnings. The dependent variable captures average 
earnings after leaving unemployment over a period of 42 months (3.5 
years).32 All estimates control for the full set of individual control variables and 
a full set of PES dummies (columns 1 to 5), or labor market region (MS) 
dummies (columns 6 and 7). 
Column (1) to (4) in Table 4 show the effects of program participation. 
Supporting treatments increase earnings; restricting treatments decrease 
them. Sanctions are especially detrimental to earnings after leaving 
unemployment, reducing them by 348 CHF or about 10 percent of average 
monthly earnings (Column 4). Workfare programs also reduce earnings but 
the reduction is 70 CHF per month, around 2 percent of monthly earnings. 
Estimating the program participation effects jointly reveals that the treatment 
effect of carrots is somewhat smaller, and the sticks effect is not as negative, 
since the baseline earnings now is non-participants for both estimates. 
Attending a supporting program increases earnings by 153 CHF per month, 
around 5 percent of earnings. A restricting program reduces earnings by 309 










Columns (5) to (7) in Table 4 discuss policy regime effects, on top of program 
participation effects. Caseworkers who intend to use restricting programs 
more frequently reduce their job seekers earnings after leaving 
unemployment, and the effect is sizeable. Increasing the intended use of 
restricting programs by 10 percentage points reduces a job seekers earnings 
by 51 CHF, or around 1.7 percent. Caseworkers who use supporting 
programs more frequently do not affect their job seekers’ earnings. 
Column (6) shows that the variation in policy regimes at the PES level also 
matters. Increased use of restricting policies reduces job seeker’s earnings. 
The PES effect is stronger than the caseworker effect: a 10 percentage point 
increase in the use of restricting programs decreases a job seeker’s earnings 
by 106 CHF per month, about 3.4 percent of earnings. Interestingly, increased 
use of supporting programs has the opposite effect: 94 CHF per month, 2.8 
percent, more if supporting programs increase by 10 percentage points. 
Column (7) shows the full model. Results indicate that all aspects matter: 
program participation, caseworker policy regimes, and PES policies. The 
program participation effects and the PES policy effects are similar to the 
models that included only part of all explanatory variables, and so are 
caseworker policy effects.33 
Whether neglecting regime effects biases estimates of individual treatment 
effects is an interesting question. Table 4 shows estimates of the individual 
treatment effects with and without controls for regime effects. Both sets of 
estimates are similar, as individual treatment effects are identified within the 
same labor market, i.e. controlling for PES fixed effects as in column (4). 
Effects on unemployment exit rate. 
Table 5 shows how policy regimes and program participation affect the 
transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs.34 Columns (1) to (3) show 
the effects of program participation on the rate of leaving unemployment. 
Results indicate that both supporting and restricting programs reduce the 










unemployment duration is well in line with existing research (Card 
et al., 2010). Our result on restricting policies goes, at first sight, counter the 
existing literature on benefit sanctions. But bear in mind that our set of 
restricting policies encompass both benefit sanctions and participation in 
workfare programs. When we decompose the effects of these two programs 
on the unemployment exit rate, we find a positive effect of benefit sanctions 
on the unemployment exit hazard, and a negative effect of work-fare 
programs on the exit hazard (see Table 10 in the Appendix). Thus, our results 
are not contrary to the existing literature. 
Column (4) in Table 5 shows policy regime effects at the caseworker level. 
Results indicate that both, increasing the rate at which job seekers enter 
supporting and restricting programs increases their rate of leaving 
unemployment. But the quantitative magnitude differs. Supporting policies 
increase the rate of leaving unemployment about two thirds as strongly as 
restricting policies. Column (5) discusses policy regime effects at the PES 
level. Also for the PES, our results indicate that, both, regimes that use 
supporting as well as restricting policies often tend to produce a higher exit 
from unemployment, with supporting regimes playing a quantitatively more 
important role. 
Column (6) introduces both caseworker regimes as well as PES regimes. 
Interestingly, all levels of policy implementation matter. Supporting policies 
improve the rate of leaving unemployment more strongly at the PES level than 
at the caseworker level. Restricting policies are as effective at the caseworker 
and at the PES level.35 
6.2 Explaining the post-unemployment effects: employment vs. earnings 
Earlier we have seen that supporting treatments improve earnings of 
participants, and supporting PES policy regimes also increase earnings after 
leaving unemployment. These effects might arise because job seekers accept 










Table 6 shows treatment and regime effects on employment, the proportion of 
the time we observe after unemployment spent in employment, and earnings 
while employed,36 average earnings in the months a job seeker is considered 
as employed. Consider first results for employment. Columns (1) to (3) show 
treatment effects, caseworker, and PES effects, separately. Column (4) 
shows results on all dimensions. Treatment effects are positive for supporting 
policies and negative for restricting policies. Supporting programs therefore 
enhance job stability whereas restricting policies can induce job seekers to 
accept less stable employment. Policy regimes also affect job stability. PES 
offices that use supporting policies more intensely help their clients find jobs 
that they keep over a longer period whereas PES that build on restricting 
policies tend to reduce job stability of their clients. Caseworkers also matter 
but less than the PES. Caseworker use of supporting policies only marginally 
affects job stability, whereas use of restricting policies reduces job stability, by 
about half of an equivalent change in the PES’ use of restricting policies. 
Table 6 also shows results for average earnings of workers. Note that workers 
are a subset of the population, so these results do not have a causal 
interpretation. Columns (5)-(7) add treatment and policy regime effects step 
by step. Column (8) provides results on all dimensions that we consider. 
Supporting policies increase earnings of the employed by about 50 CHF, or 
about 1-2 percent of average monthly earnings while employed. Job seekers 
who had been exposed to restricting policies earn considerably less, 213 CHF 
per month, or 5-6 percent of average monthly earnings. 
Intense use of restricting, and supporting, policies by caseworkers tends to 
reduce job seeker’s earnings while employed. The effect is fairly small and on 
the margin of statistical significance for the supporting regime, but sizeable 
and significantly different from zero for the restricting regime. In contrast, PES 
offices that place a strong emphasis on supporting policies manage to place 
job seekers in jobs that pay them substantially more. PES who use restricting 










Lechner et al. (2011) study short- and long-run effects of publicly sponsored 
training for job seekers in Germany. Initial results all indicate that training 
prolongs unemployment. But medium-run and long-run effects of these 
programs are positive, suggesting that the most intensive forms of training 
can raise employment rates by up to 10 percentage points which are 
sustained for up to eight years. These effects are consistent with our findings 
for supporting programs. 
An interesting pattern of results emerges. Supporting policies help participants 
by placing them into more stable employment (at the cost of prolonged 
unemployment). Restricting policies may (or may not) improve the speed at 
which job seekers leave unemployment, but damage their post-unemployment 
prospects via reduced stability of employment and lower earnings while 
employed. Caseworkers matter strongly for exit from unemployment, but they 
affect post-unemployment job prospects relatively little. PES are both key to 
how job seekers leave unemployment and they shape post-unemployment job 
prospects strongly.37 
6.3 Policy interaction effects between carrots and sticks 
We have seen that policy regime effects matter, both for caseworkers and 
especially for PES offices. But so far, we have considered supporting and 
restricting policies in isolation. Here we study whether combining policy 
regimes changes their effectiveness. 
Table 7 repeats our baseline estimates for policy regime effects on 
unemployment exit in column (1) and displays results that have interaction 
terms for policy regimes in column (2). Results in column (2) indicate that both 
policy interactions are positive and significantly different from zero, and 
sizeable. These results indicate that having a bit of both, supporting and 
restricting, policies improves their effect on unemployment exit. Columns (3) 
and (4) in Table 7 show results for earnings after leaving unemployment. 
Results in column (4) indicate that the caseworker interaction term is positive 
and significant, whereas the interaction term for the PES regimes is not 










These results support the view that restricting and supporting programs are 
complements. Caseworkers who use a bit of both will have a client pool that 
leaves unemployment faster, and earns more after leaving unemployment, 
than caseworkers who specialize in one of the two policies. Complementarity 
also applies to PES policies, but only as far as unemployment exit is 
concerned.38 Based on these findings, we conclude that regime effects not 
only matter in isolation but also via their interplay. To achieve a more 
comprehensive, quantitative assessment of this trade-off, it is important to 
consider marginal effects as well as costs and benefits of regime changes. 
This is done in the next subsection.39 
6.4 Policy Experiments 
We use the results of Table 7 to perform three policy experiments: we 
calculate marginal effects to quantify how changes in regime intensities 
aiming at an increase of unemployment exits (θu) or of earnings actually affect 
the individual outcomes.40 
Experiment 1 simulates a region that becomes more “active” by increasing the 
intensity of the carrots and sticks policy regime, from the median level, by 
adding half a standard deviation. The resulting marginal effects are reported 
in Table 8. This experiment yields an increase of the job seeker’s 
unemployment exit hazard rate, by 8.0% due to caseworker regime and 
10.2% due to PES regime. Additionally, there is an indirect effect of regime 
changes, because they affect the amount and composition of the treated; this 
indirect impact reduces the hazard by 1.5% 41 Taken together, the total of the 
marginal effects of regime changes is of the same size as the stick treatment 
effect on unemployment exit (16.8%, compare to Table 5). The marginal effect 
of a shift in regimes might, however, also affect job seeker’s post-
unemployment earnings. Our results suggest that becoming ”active” would 
affect earnings only very little, increasing them by about 1 percentage point 











The second experiment is to become ”supportive”, shifting the intensities of 
the carrot regime up and of the stick regime down (Experiment 2a, Table 8). 
Becoming ”supportive” can have substantial positive effects on job seekers’ 
earnings after they left unemployment. ”Supportive” regions raise job seekers’ 
earnings by 4.9%, primarily through the PES regime, with caseworkers adding 
0.8% and the indirect effect 0.3% to this earnings gain. Adopting a supportive 
regime can thus raise earnings by up to 6%. Of course, supportive regimes 
may affect the time job seekers take to leave unemployment. Indeed, job 
seekers have 1.9 percent lower unemployment exit hazards, due to the PES 
supportive regime, and 0.3 percent lower unemployment exit due to 
caseworkers as well as 0.8 percent reduction due to the indirect effect. 
Supportive regimes reduce the rate at which people leave unemployment by 3 
percent. 
A third policy option is to become restrictive, shifting the intensities of the stick 
regime up and of the carrot regime down (Experiment 2b, Table 8). Our 
simulations suggest that this restrictive regime has detrimental consequences 
for post-unemployment earnings. Job seekers would find jobs paying them 
about 5.0% less due to the PES regime, and a further 1.1 % less due to the 
caseworker regime; the indirect effect reduces earnings by 0.3%. Restrictive 
regimes depress earnings in total by about 6.4%, overall. In contrast, being 
restrictive encourages unemployment exit. Indeed, unemployment exit rates 
are in total 1.6% higher, mostly due to the PES regime that becomes 
restrictive.42 
Policy experiments also affect the UI budget. We now compare changes in 
benefit payments due to marginal regime effects on unemployment durations 
(and benefit cuts because of sanctions) with the incremental cost of adapted 
treatment intensities. The details on the performed simulations are described 
in section A.2 of the Appendix. 
Regions that become ”active”, increasing both carrots and sticks, reduce 
individual unemployment duration by 27 days. Besides this direct impact of 










composition of the treated) prolongs unemployment by 5 days. On net, 
switching to active regimes lowers unemployment benefit payments by 2284 
CHF (Table 9, Experiment 1). Note that the regime effects affect the full 
sample of unemployed. Active regimes also save on benefit payments due to 
benefit sanctions, 82 CHF on average. The savings due to additionally 
imposed sanctions are marginal43. The direct cost of additional supporting 
treatments caused by the upward shift of the carrot regime amount to 240 
CHF due to more intense training, and 77 CHF due to increased job search 
assistance, or about 317 CHF p.p. in total. The direct cost of strengthening 
the stick regime results in an increase of 14 CHF because of stricter 
monitoring, and 170 CHF due to workfare programs, i.e. a total increase of 
184 CHF. Thus, in total the UI budget decreases by 1866 CHF or 7.3% of 
total benefit cost per person by marginally tightening both regimes. 
The supportive regime increases the UI budget, because they pay more 
unemployment benefits, due to longer spells and reduced sanction intensity 
(Table 9, Experiment 2a). Becoming supportive is less costly in terms of the 
costs of operating the policy regimes. Supportive regions pay some more to 
train and assist job seekers, but recoup most of the cost by being less 
restricting. On net, supportive regions pay 849 CHF more, or about 3.3% of 
the cost per job seeker. 
The restrictive regime does not affect the budget much, reducing it by 237 
CHF, or 0.9% (Table 9, Experiment 2b). Shifting some treatment intensity 
from stick to carrot keeps the operating costs neutral. Moreover, because both 
sticks and carrots regimes improve unemployment exit to the same extent, 
there are no first order effects on unemployment benefit payments. 
Our simulations illustrate that the policies that reduce the UI budget are not 
the same as the policies that maintain post-unemployment earnings capacity. 
The active policy regime reduces the UI budget more strongly than the other 
policy options. However, the supportive policy regime increases post-











Policy regime effects are quantitatively important. Both caseworkers and PES 
agencies can strongly increase the exit rate from unemployment by using 
supporting or restricting policies more intensively. PES agencies are also very 
important for earnings after leaving unemployment. Supporting policies 
increase earnings after job seekers leave unemployment, restricting policies 
reduce them. Quantitatively, restricting regimes are more important for 
earnings than supporting regimes. Interestingly, caseworkers are much less 
important for post-unemployment outcomes than for the duration of the 
unemployment spell. 
We also find treatment effects to be important. Both supporting and restricting 
programs tend to prolong unemployment, restricting programs do so because 
of the workfare component. Supporting programs then increase earnings after 
unemployment substantially, whereas restricting programs decrease what job 
seekers take home. 
What do our results imply for labor market policy? First, we document that 
policy regimes matter. Compared to the actual treatment effects, policy 
regime effects are small, but they affect a much larger group of job seekers, 
so they produce sizeable aggregate effects. Evaluations of ALMP that only 
take treatment effects into account miss a substantial part of the effects 
triggered by ALMPs. From a methodological point of view, our findings imply 
that omission of regime effects in studies of treatment effects may lead to 
violation of unconfoundedness assumptions. 
Second, supporting and restricting policies affect unemployment duration in 
the same way, whereas their effect on earnings is opposite. Both supporting 
and restricting policy regimes shorten unemployment duration but supporting 
policy regimes increase earnings whereas restricting policy regimes decrease 
them. A similar comparison holds for actually attending the programs. Both 
supporting and restricting programs prolong unemployment, but supporting 










Third, interactions between policy regimes are present and suggest 
supporting and restricting policies are complements. Agencies that focus on 
maximizing exit from unemployment would find using both restricting and 
supporting programs helpful. At the same time, this strategy has a further 
payoff in terms of increased post-unemployment earnings. Combined use of 
the two policy instruments appears to dominate specializing in just one of 
them. 
We end this section by highlighting two extensions of our approach. First, one 
could allow for unobserved heterogeneity of unemployed workers. Yet this 
requires even larger data sets and leads to an even higher computational 
burden. Second, regime effects could be further decomposed beyond 
distinguishing carrots and sticks. The proposed flexible regime estimation 
strategy can directly be applied to estimating separate regime effects for a 
refined set of ALMPs. 
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A Online Appendix 
A.1 Supplementary tables 
A.2 Marginal regime effects and simulations for cost-benefit analysis 
A.2.1 Marginal regime effects on exit hazards and post-unemployment earnings 
In the case of the unemployment exit outcome we calculate the marginal 
effect – expressed as a percentage change in the exit hazard – as follows: 
Define ( )n nF med F  as the median intensity of policy regime { , , }n c s cs  
(c=carrot, s=stick, cs=interaction of both); whereby 
cs c sF F F . Also define 
( ) 0.5 ( )n n nF med F sd F   , i.e. the policy intensity shifted by 0.5 standard 
deviation (+ or –, depending on the experiment); whereby 
cs c sF F F    . The 
direct effect is 
( , , , ) ( , , , )
( , , , )
c s cs c s cs
c s cs
x F F F x F F F




; this reduces to 
[ 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )] 1c c s sexp sd F sd F   . The additional interaction effect amounts to 
( , , , ) ( , , , )
( , , , )
c s cs c s cs
c s cs
x F F F x F F F
x F F F
 

     
. Note that – for simplicity of exposition – 
we ignore here the fact that every type of policy regime appears twice, once 
for caseworkers and once for PES. Thus, we compute the presented effects 
separately for caseworkers and for PES. On top of the direct effect and the 
interaction effect of marginally changing Fn, we also compute the indirect 
effect of such policy changes. This effect arises through the fact that changing 
the policy intensities Fn leads to a change in the population of job seekers 
who are treated. To calculate this effect, we proceed in two steps. First, we 
determine who is additionally non-/affected by the corresponding experiment 
and, among those, who is predicted to have non-zero observed treatment 
exposure. The procedure to determine this is described in the steps (2) and 
(3) in the next subsection A.2.2. Second, we compute the indirect effect by 
predicting ( , , , )c s csx F F F     for all individuals once with adjusted treatment 










as relative change we take the difference of the before-mentioned predictions 
and divide it by the prediction based on the existing treatment exposure. Note 
that this indirect effect is caused by policy changes in Fn, but it is purely driven 
by compositional changes in the treated population which affect the treatment 
effects predictions. 
In the case of post-unemployment earnings the total marginal effect around 
median policies is 
0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) [ 0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) 0.25 ( ) ( )]c c s s cs c s s c c ssd F sd F F sd F F sd F sd F sd F      , with 
obvious decomposition in direct and interaction effect. This absolute marginal 
earnings effect is finally standardized by expressing it as a percentage 
change in non-treated average earnings (3342 CHF). The indirect effect on 
earnings is computed in the same way as exposed above for the hazards. 
The results of all these computations are reported in Table 8 in the main text. 
A.2.2 Marginal regime effects on unemployment durations and treatment cost 
Additional cost and benefits from marginal regime effects arise (primarily) 
from the resulting changes in unemployment durations, on one hand, and 
changes in the amount of assigned treatments, on the other hand. Thus, to 
perform a cost-benefit analysis we need to quantify these changes in a 
tractable unit and multiply them with corresponding cost/benefit rates per unit. 
To achieve this, we proceed in several steps. 
(1) Predict the effects of a marginal regime change on unemployment durations. 
A shift of the policy regimes affects everyone in the sample. Therefore, we 
first simulate the marginal effect of changing the regimes by 0.5 s.d. on 
expected unemployment duration for the full sample. Using the estimation 
results of the interacted model for ( )u t  (see Table 7, column (2)), we 
compute the following individual-level predictions: 
[ | , , , ] [ | , , , ]u c s cs u c s csE T x F F F E T x F F F     
following the (simplified) notation defined in the section above. I.e., we 










regime variables set once to median / 0.5 . .s d   and once to median level 
(leaving the treatment effects and other x variables unchanged). The 
difference between the averages of the individual predicted unemployment 
duration under changed and under median regime represent the marginal 
regime effects (of the corresponding policy experiment). Since this effect 
applies to everyone, it is evaluated for the full sample. In addition, we also 
calculate the indirect effect for each experiment, which arises through the 
compositional adjustment of who is exposed to treatment due to the 
marginally changing policy regimes. To do this, we proceed in the same way 
as described in the last subsection A.2.1, but now we compute the 
corresponding predictions with adjusted versus existing treatment exposure 
for Tu. 
(2) More (or less) individuals get carrots/sticks due to the marginal regime change: use Fc/Fs rank to 
determine these additionally (non-)affected people. 
Due to the nature of the policy regime definition, as derived in section 4.2, the 
ranking by Fc and Fs directly allows us to determine in the data who is 
additionally (not) affected (any more) by the marginal regime shift. Since Fc 
and Fs represent probabilities to be affected by a certain type of treatment 
event, it suffices to sort the population according to these intensity measures 
to determine the group within 0.5 s.d. above (below) the median intensity as 
the additionally (non-)affected individuals. These groups are determined for 
each of the four regimes (”carrot” or ”stick”, by CW or PES). 
(3) Predict the treatment durations/incidences which are implied by applying a carrot/stick regime: for 
additionally (non-)affected individuals. 
Our UIR-SSR database contains detailed individual-level information on 
realized treatment durations or incidences for the observed treated 
individuals. In particular, we observe and distinguish four treatment types per 
individual: (1) total duration of training, (2) total duration of job search 
assistance program participation, (3) total duration of workfare program 
participation, (4) total number of enforced benefit sanctions and the related 
number of days of cut benefits. We use these data to predict the 










follows. First note that – due to the fact that by far not everyone is observed 
treated (see Table 3) – we have to deal with large proportions of zeros in the 
treatment durations/incidences. Therefore, we first regress an indicator of 
zero treatment outcome on all the control variables (as used in the main 
estimations) for the population affected by the respective median intensity 
regime. Then, we predict the probability of a zero treatment outcome for the 
additionally (non-)affected individuals and rank/sort them according to this 
probability. Assuming that the proportion of zeros is the same as in the 
median intensity population, we determine according to this ranking who is 
supposed to get a non-zero treatment exposure. For those, we predict the 
outcome duration/incidence of the corresponding treatment type, based on a 
regression44 of the treatment outcome on all controls for the non-zero 
outcomes in the respective median intensity population. Note that these steps 
are performed for each of the four types of treatments and for each policy 
regime (”carrot” or ”stick”, by CW or PES). 
(4) Cost data per treatment type and year: sources and calculation of per-unit figures. 
The Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs (SECO) provided us specific 
cost data per type of treatment and year (from the process data monitoring of 
the UI). We combine this information with individual-level counts of treatment 
durations/incidences from the UIR-SSR database to calculate the average 
treatment cost per unit (for ALMP: per day; for sanctions: per incidence) and 
type and year. Moreover, we collected the figure of the average daily benefits 
paid to males by year from official statistics45. 
(5) Calculation of total cost: (treatment durations/incidences ⋅ per-unit costs), summed over all relevant 
treatment types. 
Finally, we multiply the predicted treatment durations/incidences with the 
corresponding cost figures. For ”carrot” regimes we consider training and job 
search assistance treatment durations, for ”stick” regimes incidences of 
imposed sanctions and workfare durations. To complement the picture, we 
also compute the saved days of benefits due to sanctions in the same 
manner. By summing up these components of additional (less) cost across 










corresponding regime change. Since the regime change affects everyone, this 
cost is divided by the full sample population. We report the final figures by 
treatment type and as a total per regime. This total change in cost is, 
moreover, expressed as a proportion of the average total benefit cost (i.e., the 
predicted unemployment duration under median regimes multiplied by daily 
benefits) of a job seeker. 
All these steps are performed for each case of the three experiments 1, 2a 
and 2b, which imply positive or negative changes of the ”carrot” and/or ”stick” 
intensities by 0.5 standard deviations, respectively. The results are reported in 










Fig. 1 Transition rates 
 
Notes: Graph A shows the empirical transition rate out of unemployment. 
Graph B shows the empirical transition rate to restricting (sticks) programs, 
and to supporting (carrots) programs. Restricting programs are benefit 
sanctions and workfare programs. Supporting programs include job 










Fig. 2 Earnings and employment paths 
 
Notes: Graph A shows two earnings measures. “Earnings while employed” 
(dashed line) represent average earnings among those who are employed 
during the month. “Earnings” (solid line) measure average earnings, i.e. with 
zero earnings in case of non-employment. Graph B depicts employment. 
Earnings and employment paths are relative to the month of entry into 
unemployment according to the unemployment duration measure in the 










Fig. 3 Observed and intended policy intensities by PES; “carrots”; “sticks” 
 
Notes: This figure shows intended use of programs on the vertical axis vs 
observed use of programs on the horizontal axis. The solid line represent the 










Fig. 4 Observed vs. intended policies by PES and caseworker 
 
Notes: This figure shows observed (dark) and intended (red) intensities of 
carrots and sticks. Each dot represents a PES agency (left) or a caseworker 
(right). The dashed line presents the association between the two policies 














mean sd  
    
Unemployment duration  (median, days)  144   
    
Realized treatments     
supportive (”carrots”)  (incidence)  0.219  
0.41
4 
supportive: duration  (median, days)  97   
restrictive (”sticks”)  (incidence)  0.187  
0.39
0 
restrictive: duration  (median, days)  71   
    
Socio-demographic characteristics 
(selection)    
marital status  single  0.453   
 married  0.463   
education  compulsory (-9y.)  0.276   
 
vocational short (-
11y.)  0.094   
 
vocational degree (-
13y.) 0.504   
 high school (-13y.)  0.028   
 tertiary  0.098   
occupation  blue collar  0.136   













mean sd  
 gastronomy, cleaning  0.134   
employability  low  0.145   
 middle  0.718   
age (years)   36.1  11.0  
household size   2.16  1.35  
not swiss   0.422   
doesn’t speak local language   0.394   
    
Unemployment spells   
131 
037   
    
Notes: Sample used in main estimations (men, aged 20-61.5). Mean 
proportions if no other unit is stated. Realized treatments: incidence=at least 
on realized treatment of corresponding type (supporting, restricting); 
duration=duration from unemployment entry to realization of the treatment. 











Table 2 Leeway in the Swiss ALMP System 
 Canton to PES PES to Caseworker 
 percent  percent  
(1) no guidelines (freedom) 4.08  13.27  
(2) rough guidelines  57.14  56.12  
(3) detailed guidelines  32.65  29.59  
(4) very detailed guidelines 5.10  0.00  
   
Notes: Responses to the question “How detailed are the directions that you 
receive from your supervising agency (canton)?” for the Canton to PES 
column, and “How detailed are the directions that you give to your 
caseworkers?” for the PES to Caseworker column. One person provided no 
answer to both questions. 98 heads of PES. 










Table 3 Observed frequencies of policy usage and intended policy intensities, 
by PES and by caseworkers. Descriptive statistics 
   mean median s.d. 
observed PES ”carrot” 0.2155 0.2247 0.0615 
 PES ”stick” 0.1853 0.1723 0.0727 
 cw. ”carrot” 0.2150 0.2263 0.0647 
 cw. ”stick” 0.1848 0.1852 0.0690 
      
intended PES ”carrot” 0.5843 0.5895 0.1510 
 PES ”stick” 0.5292 0.5288 0.1833 
 cw. ”carrot” 0.5859 0.5958 0.1707 
 cw. ”stick” 0.5315 0.5324 0.1998 
      
Observations   131,037   
      
Notes: Calculations based on main sample (males aged 20-61.5). cw. = 
caseworker. Observed frequencies are averages per PES or per caseworker. 
The estimation of the intended policy intensities is described in Subsection 
4.2. We distinguish between 168 PES and 717 caseworkers (small caseloads 
below 100, males and females, are aggregated in a residual caseworker 
category/dummy variable). 









Table 4 The effect of carrots and sticks policies and treatments on monthly 
earnings (over 3.5 years; men) 














 (19.36)  (21.33) (21.27) (21.35) (21.21) (21.32) 
















  (16.30)  (17.96) (18.19) (18.04) (18.45) 
sanction TE   
-
348.3**
*     
   (18.84)     
workfare TE   -70.16**     
   (34.56)     
carrot policy 
CW     36.03  -13.52 
     (71.03)  (70.33) 







     (79.25)  (74.59) 
carrot policy 





      (137.9) (136.1) 
stick policy 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
      (165.1) (159.8) 
















 (70.79) (70.79) (70.79) (70.79) (80.41) (97.55) (111.8) 
        
obs. (spells) 
131,03
7 131,037 131,037 131,037 131,037 131,037 131,037 
R2 0.380 0.381 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.377 0.377 
FE at level PES PES PES PES PES MS MS 
        
Note: TE=treatment effect; CW=caseworker; PES=Public Employment 
Service office; FE=fixed effect; MS=labor market regions (spatial mobility 










Table 5 The effect of carrots and sticks policies and treatments on 
unemployment exit (hazard rate; men) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
























carrot policy CW    0.188***  0.165*** 
    (0.0297)  (0.0300) 
stick policy CW    0.274***  0.267*** 
    (0.0260)  (0.0262) 
carrot policy 
PES     0.363*** 0.344*** 
     (0.0527) (0.0529) 
stick policy PES     0.272*** 0.248*** 
     (0.0405) (0.0406) 
       
intercept -4.718*** -4.750*** -4.724*** -4.943*** -5.254*** -5.441*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0355) (0.0380) (0.0411) 
       
obs. (spells) 131037 131037 131037 131037 131037 131037 
log-likelihood -198722 -199705 -198519 -198433 -198685 -198608 
FE at level PES PES PES PES MS MS 










Note: TE=treatment effect; CW=caseworker; PES=Public Employment 
Service office; FE=fixed effect; MS=labor market regions (spatial mobility 










Table 6 Explaining the post-ue effect: employment propensity (proportion of 
months employed within observation window) vs. monthly earnings while 










 effect on employment effect on earnings while employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
carrot TE 0.0347*** 0.0350*** 0.0353*** 0.0355*** 37.17* 44.34** 41.68** 49.43** 
 (0.00273) (0.00274) (0.00273) (0.00274) (20.05) (20.12) (20.12) (20.19) 
stick TE -0.0397*** -0.0368*** -0.0361*** -0.0336*** -234.0*** -221.9*** -222.1*** -212.7*** 
 (0.00271) (0.00273) (0.00271) (0.00274) (17.53) (17.63) (17.58) (17.84) 
carrot policy CW  0.0184**  0.0176*  -114.9*  -166.9*** 
  (0.00904)  (0.00909)  (63.74)  (64.37) 
stick policy CW  -0.0690***  -0.0627***  -239.4***  -173.7*** 
  (0.00865)  (0.00845)  (68.63)  (66.32) 
carrot policy PES   0.0534*** 0.0494***   771.6*** 787.2*** 
   (0.0168) (0.0167)   (120.6) (120.1) 
stick policy PES   -0.127*** -0.120***   -619.3*** -603.3*** 
   (0.0149) (0.0145)   (142.5) (139.3) 










 effect on employment effect on earnings while employed 
intercept 0.718*** 0.744*** 0.741*** 0.763*** 3,882*** 4,052*** 4,018*** 4,165*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0113) (0.0127) (0.0137) (64.98) (74.51) (91.80) (104.8) 
         
obs. (spells) 131,037 131,037 131,037 131,037 119,033 119,033 119,033 119,033 
R2 0.169 0.170 0.167 0.167 0.431 0.432 0.426 0.426 
FE at level PES PES MS MS PES PES MS MS 
         










Note: The outcome variable in models (1) to (4) is the proportion of months 
employed within the post-unemployment observation window (42 months). In 
models (5) to (8) the outcome variable is average monthly earnings when 
employed within the same observation period; the number of observations in 
these models is slightly smaller due to individuals who never generate 
employment earnings within the observation window. TE=treatment effect; 
CW=caseworker; PES=Public Employment Service office; FE=fixed effect; 
MS=labor market regions (spatial mobility areas). Standard errors in 










Table 7 Policy interactions between carrots and sticks: marginal 
substitution/compensation effects when deviating from median policy intensity 
(ue exit and post-ue earnings; men) 
 unemployment exit post-ue earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
carrot TE -0.416*** -0.414*** 163.8*** 167.0***  
 (0.00888) (0.00889) (21.32) (21.33) 
stick TE -0.184*** -0.183*** -265.6*** -264.5*** 
 (0.00863) (0.00863) (18.45) (18.44) 
carrot policy CW 0.165*** 0.176*** -13.52 -2.088 
 (0.0300) (0.0300) (70.33) (69.56) 
stick policy CW 0.267*** 0.274*** -429.1*** -417.4*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0262) (74.59) (75.87) 
carrot policy PES 0.344*** 0.392*** 932.4*** 975.1*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0533) (136.1) (130.9) 
stick policy PES 0.248*** 0.252*** -1,014*** -1,008*** 
 (0.0406) (0.0406) (159.8) (160.2) 
policy interaction CW  0.307***  673.2** 
  (0.105)  (270.0) 
policy interaction PES  0.444***  106.8 
  (0.132)  (365.8) 
intercept -4.866*** -4.855*** 3,350*** 3,360*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0257) (62.30) (62.59) 
     
obs. (spells) 131,037 131,037 131,037 131,037 
log-likelihood -198608 -198585   










 unemployment exit post-ue earnings 
FE at level MS MS MS MS 
     
Note: The policy and interaction variables are defined here as deviations from 
the respective median policy intensity. TE=treatment effect; CW=caseworker; 
PES=Public Employment Service office; FE=fixed effect; MS=labor market 
regions (spatial mobility areas). Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** 










Table 8 Policy experiments: Unemployment and earnings 
marginal effects unemployment exit post-ue earnings 
 (% change hazard) (% non-treated earn.) 
 caseworker  PES  casworker  PES  
Experiment 1:     
carrots ↑ and sticks ↑ by 0.5 s.d.     
direct effect 0.0433  0.0541 -0.0125  -0.0056 
+ interaction effect 0.0370  0.0483  0.0229  0.0032 
total 0.0803  0.1024 0.0103  -0.0024 
indirect effect -0.0147   -0.0007   
     
Experiment 2a:     
carrots ↑ and sticks ↓ by 0.5 s.d.     
direct effect -0.0123  0.0065 0.0124  0.0497 
+ interaction effect -0.0068  -0.0094 -0.0046  -0.0007 
total -0.0191  -0.0028 0.0079  0.0490 
indirect effect -0.0075   0.0026   
     
Experiment 2b:     
carrots ↓ and sticks ↑ by 0.5 s.d.     
direct effect 0.0124  -0.0065 -0.0124  -0.0497 
+ interaction effect 0.0014  0.0030 0.0011  0.0002 
total 0.0139  -0.0035 -0.0113  -0.0495 
indirect effect 0.0059   -0.0032   
     










Notes: Marginal effects are computed based on the results in Table 7. They 
evaluate shifts of carrot and stick policy regimes from median level by 0.5 
standard deviations (see figures in Table 3). See Appendix A.2 for a 
description how marginal effects are calculated. 










 Experiment 1 Experiment 2a Experiment 2b 
 (C +0.5sd, S +0.5sd) (C +0.5sd, S -0.5sd) (C -0.5sd, S +0.5sd) 
(A) changes in benefit payments    
...direct effect: in days of UE per person -26.6 3.0 0.6 
...+ indirect effect: in days of UE per person 4.8 3.0 -0.7 
...in CHF per person -2283.8 628.3 -3.6 
    
benefit cuts due to sanctions (CHF p.p.) -81.9 85.77 -95.6 
    
(B) change in cost of treatments    
carrots    
...for training (CHF p.p.) 239.2 239.2 -242.4 
...for job search assistance (CHF p.p.) 76.9 76.9 -78.9 
sticks    
...for enforced sanctions (CHF p.p.) 14.1 -14.7 14.1 










 Experiment 1 Experiment 2a Experiment 2b 
    
Total change in cost (A+B; CHF p.p.) -1866.2 848.5 -237.1 
...in % of total benefit cost p.p. -7.3% 3.3% -0.9% 
    










Notes: See Appendix A.2 for a description of the simulations and 
computations of the benefit and cost figures above. 1 CHF = 0.92 EUR = 1.02 
USD. 
Table 10 The transition of a single-treatment-effect setup to the “carrots and 
sticks” setup: Decomposition of treatment effects on unemployment exit 










model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
carrot yes    yes yes yes yes 
stick  yes decomp. decomp. decomp. decomp. yes yes 
censored    yes yes  yes  
         
carrot TE -0.342***    -0.430*** -0.415*** -0.419*** -0.407*** 
 (0.00819)    (0.00947) (0.00883) (0.00946) (0.00882) 
stick TE  -0.0073     -0.0819*** -0.171*** 
  (0.00795)     (0.00912) (0.00855) 
sanction TE   0.0590*** 0.0430*** 0.0224** -0.102***   
   (0.00841) (0.00973) (0.00960) (0.00892)   
workfare TE   -0.340*** -0.481*** -0.546*** -0.535***   
   (0.0188) (0.0210) (0.0207) (0.0192)   
         
intercept -4.718*** -4.750*** -4.759*** -4.578*** -4.683*** -4.734*** -4.673*** -4.724*** 










model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
obs. (spells) 131037 131037 131037 131037 131037 131037 131037 131037 
parameters 296 296 297 297 298 298 297 297 
log-likelihood -198722 -199705 -199479 -168675 -190673 -198251 -191070 -198519 
FE at level PES PES PES PES PES PES PES PES 
         










Notes: decomp.=decomposition of stick effect into effect of sanction and effect 
of workfare program; TE=treatment effect; FE=fixed effect; censored= spell is 
censored at occurrence of first event of the other type (than the reported TE; 
in model 4, the control group spells are censored at occurrence of a carrot 










Table 11 Second Event, by First Treatment 
first event second event 
 incidence percent duration  incidence percent duration 
”carrot”  28’750  21.94  97  ”carrot”  7’554  26.27  196  
    ”stick”  6’284  21.86  237 
    –  14’912  51.87   
”stick”  24’564  18.75  71  ”carrot”  4’387  17.86  143  
    ”stick”  7’267  29.58  130  
    –  12’910  52.56   
no policy  77’723  59       
 131’037        
        











Table 12 The effect of carrots and stick policies and treatments on monthly 
earnings (over 3.5 years;men), Not-controlling for unemployment duration 




















 (18.18)   (18.74)  (18.74)  (18.68)  (18.57)  (18.59)  
















  (15.69)   (16.22)  (16.25)  (16.22)  (16.32)  
workfare TE   
-
690.5**
*     
   (32.83)      
sanction TE   
-
627.7**
*     
   (17.51)      
carrot policy 
CW     162.9*   157.8*  
     (70.35)   (68.57)  
stick policy 
CW     
-
278.6**
*  -55.4  
     (73.12)   (61.07)  
carrot policy 















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  
)  )  
stick policy 
































obs. (spells) 131037  131037  131037  131037  131037  131037  131037  
R2 0.359  0.363  0.365  0.365  0.365  0.360  0.360  
FE at level PES  PES  PES  PES  PES  MS  MS  
        
 
Notes 
1 For lack of better terminology, we also refer to these as supporting and 
restricting policies. 
2 Results for women are similar to those we document in this paper. Results 
are available upon request. 
3 In particular, if a program expands in its usage then it is plausible that ex 
ante effects increase in size but it also becomes more likely that firms and 
non-eligible unemployed workers modify their behavior in response to a 
sizeable fraction of the workforce being treated. In addition, the changes in 
the size of ex ante effects may at a macro scale themselves induce further 
behavioral responses. See e.g. Albrecht et al. (2009) for a theoretical and 










for evaluation frameworks with indirect effects of policies via aggregate labor 
market outcomes. 
4 Somewhat related studies consider effects of warnings or notifications of the 
likelihood of future individual treatments (see Lalive et al. (2005) for a “sticks” 
policy, and Crépon et al. (2018) for a “carrots” policy). 
5 Pavoni et al. (2013) discuss the optimal combination of work-first and job-
search-first programs in a theoretical setting where skills depreciate over the 
course of the unemployment spell. Wunsch (2009) adapts the Pavoni-Violante 
framework to study optimal job search assistance in West Germany. 
6 Recent progress on mediation analysis in duration settings include 
VanderWeele (2011). Quantification of direct vs. indirect effects on hazard 
rates requires a number of assumptions; see e.g. Lange and Hansen (2011) 
and Kaufman et al. (2004). However, regime effects are not mediators of a 
treatment since they affect, and change, the behavior of potentially all job 
seekers in a population. 
7 Below we also discuss additional existing literature with Swiss data in some 
more detail. 
8 In our observation window, 1 CHF = 0.96 Euro on average. 
9 A suitable job has to meet four criteria: (i) the travel time from home to job 
must not exceed two hours, (ii) the new job contract can not specify longer 
hours of availability than are actually paid, (iii) the new job must not be in a 
firm which lays off and re-hires for lower wages, and (iv) the new job must pay 
at least 68% of previous monthly earnings. Potential job offers are supplied by 
the public vacancy information system of the PES, from private temporary 
help firms or from the job seeker’s own pool of potential jobs. Setting the 
minimum number of job applications is largely at the discretion of the 










10 Workers who anticipate loosing their job are eligible for training until they 
start receiving benefits. 
11 Empirically, subsidized employment rarely starts before the carrot and stick 
interventions start. Fewer than 3% of treated job seekers in our sample 
started subsidized employment before the treatment we analyze. 
12 E.g. some areas tested practices where caseworker assignment switches 
after 6 or 9 months; but this is a minor quantity. Other reasons for occasional 
assignment changes are that caseworkers leave the PES to look for another 
job or when they are sick. 
13 Results for women are qualitatively similar to those for men; regime effects 
are somewhat less strong for women than for men. 
14 Some job seekers receive a second treatment during their spell. We focus 
on the first treatment primarily because it avoids a list of complications that we 
discuss in Section 4. Note that the first treatment type is somewhat 
informative on the treatment history. For instance, of those job seekers who 
enter a supporting program first, 52% experience no second treatment and 
22% enter a supporting program for a second time. Similarly, of those job 
seekers who first experience a “stick” event, 53% experience no further event 
and 30% experience a second “stick” event. Table 11 in the Appendix 
displays patterns of first and second treatment. The probability of a second 
treatment does not depend strongly on the nature of the first treatment, i.e. 
probability of first treatment exposure is similar to second treatment exposure 
for those with treatment exposure. 
15 The increase in mean earnings primarily reflects eligibility conditions for 
unemployment benefits which state that job seekers need to have been 
working in the two years prior to entering unemployment. 
16 Changes of more than 20 percentiles (in absolute value) occur for less than 










17 Only 7.6% of the cases are affected by a switch in the CW/PES relation. 
Moreover, most of these are due to PES reorganizations involving a change in 
the catchment area or an expansion or merely a change of name. In such 
cases it is far from clear that the PES environment actually changed for the 
caseworker. We carried out sensitivity analyses in which we only use such 
subsets of the data. The signs of parameter estimates are similar to those 
obtained with the full data set but the reduced sample size results in high 
standard errors. Below we also discuss estimates of specifications in which 
the PES parameters are discarded altogether. 
18 We discuss the role of unobserved covariates below. Note that even in their 
absence, some regularity assumptions need to be satisfied; for example, it is 
not allowed that one type of treatment can only occur after the other type. 
19 We could extend the competing-risks setting by including observations of 
the occurrence of a second treatment if that is of a different type than the first. 
However, this would simultaneously necessitate the estimation of the causal 
effect of the first treatment at durations in-between the first and second 
treatment. Clearly, this means a loss of all the computational advantages of 
our approach. Moreover, it means that we would need to address the 
occurrence of consecutive treatments of the same type as well, and the 
estimated intended-policy indicators would be sensitive to the assumptions 
about chain reactions between treatments and treatment effects as well as the 
contents of the second treatment. 
20 The regime definition assumes that the probability of entering a treatment 
by the end of a two year period, or 730 days, matters. Setting the regime 
period to one year, or 365 days, does not change the results, as the estimated 
probabilities over the two year period (as in the baseline) and the one year 
period are highly correlated. Estimates based on the one year horizon are 
almost identical to those based on the two year horizon. 
21 Clearly, individuals have an incentive to stay unemployed in order to benefit 










However, such strategic ex ante effects on the outcomes are part of the policy 
regime effects that we are after in the analysis of the outcomes of interest. 
The same applies to scenarios in which PES and CW with intensive 
supporting regimes invest more effort in getting to know the job seeker. Such 
a more effective service may enhance the job seeker’s search efficiency (how 
and where to search) and increase job offer arrival rates before the actual job 
search assistance program participation takes place. Finally, we expect that 
restricting (sticks) policies have regime effects that affect treated and non-
treated. Interestingly, Lalive et al. (2005) and Arni et al. (2013), who study the 
effects of unemployment benefit sanctions in Switzerland, document that non-
sanctioned job seekers leave unemployment more quickly in PES that use 
sanctions more often. 
22 This setting is inspired by the job search model with monitoring and 
sanctions in Abbring et al. (2005). 
23 Notice that in the outcome equation for ( )u t  (or, equivalently, for tu) for, 
say, individual i, the Fc and Fs terms are estimated in a first stage from which 
individual i is not excluded. Formally, those estimates depend not only on the 
observations of the actual treatment statuses and the actual realizations of tu 
of other clients with the same CW or PES, but also on the corresponding 
observations for individual i himself. However, with the sample sizes we have 
on numbers of clients per CW and PES this problem is of negligible order, and 
a more sophisticated procedure would be computationally very challenging. 
Simulations suggest that in our setting the estimates for the parameters of the 
outcome equations are not affected by this. 
24 In total, 5.8% of the unemployment spells are right-censored. One reason 
for the low censoring rate is that we continue to follow everyone after UI 
entitlement exhaustion by using social security data. We right-censor 
unemployment durations exceeding 730 days. Some of these may be due to 
coding errors in the transition date out of unemployment. For the censored 
observations we use the censored duration in the above equation and we use 










25 At the individual level, the estimated regime indicators depend in a non-
linear way on individual characteristics that also directly enter the main 
outcome equations. To investigate how sensitive the results are with respect 
to the non-linearity embedded in the first stage of the estimation procedure, 
we have estimated ad-hoc linear specifications of the first-stage equations to 
obtain alternative estimated regime effects and we used the linear predictions 
in the second stage. Keeping in mind that such a linear approach is difficult to 
implement and to justify in a dynamic framework with multiple treatment types, 
we find that the resulting sanction effect estimates differ somewhat from those 
based on the baseline specification but the estimated carrot effects are similar 
(details are available upon request). 
26 The full list of covariates features: age (9 categories), marital status (3 cat.), 
highest educational attainment (7), function in last job (5), occupation in last 
job (16), nationality group (8), knowledge of the regional language (and its 
interactions with low-level and no qualifications), knowledge in a first and a 
second foreign language (2 dummies), unemployment spell in past 3 years 
(dummy), employability scale (5 cat.), residency status (5), potential benefit 
duration (7), replacement ratio (7), household size (6), disability insurance (DI) 
application (dummy), partial DI (dummy), eligibility only for ALMPs (dummy), 
month of inflow into UI (12), log of elapsed unemployment duration (up to 6th 
polynomial; only in post-unemployment models), MS region fixed effects 
(105), history of past earnings over 5 years: de-meaned monthly earnings, 
averages over intervals (months 1, 2-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-21, 
22-24, 25-27, 28-30, 31-33, 34-36, 37-42, 43-48,49-54, 55-60 before 
unemployment entry). 
27 Arni et al. (2013) study sanction effects using Swiss data and find that 
modelling selection due to unobservables becomes unnecessary for the 
unemployment duration analysis once one conditions on pre-unemployment 
earnings and employment histories. We have assessed regime effects for 
program participants and non-participants. We find regime effects are similar 
and not significantly different for both types of job seekers in all respects, 









difference is weakly significant (when allowing for a treatment effect). This 
approximate test suggests that observed characteristics (incl. treatments) 
capture selection into three regimes well, but less so selection into 
caseworker carrot regimes. 
28 Other reasons for assignment were employability and age but these were 
mentioned by fewer than 10 % of all caseworkers. 
29 We proceed as follows. The seven types of job seekers are: job seeker who 
enters unemployment after an apprenticeship, job seeker with good 
prospects, job seeker with bad prospects, qualified Swiss, un-qualified Swiss, 
qualified immigrant, un-qualified immigrant. Caseworkers indicate for each job 
seeker profile whether they think restricting and supporting programs are 
important. We aggregate the number of times a caseworker finds a program is 
important and end up with a number that ranges from zero to seven. Seven 
indicates that a caseworker would use the program regardless of the type of 
job seeker he or she is serving. Zero indicates the caseworker would never 
use the program. 
30 One may consider using the caseworker specific use of a treatment as an 
instrument for treatment itself, as in e.g. Markussen et al. (2012). This 
approach fails in our setting, since caseworkers and job seekers entertain a 
long-term relationship that reveals information on the caseworker regime to 
the job seeker before any treatment. Indeed, it is one of our aims to 
investigate whether job seekers react to this information. Adopting the 
caseworker candidate instrument, we would have to assume that caseworker 
regime effects do not exist. For this reason we do not present analyses 
excluding actual treatment effects since such an analysis merely averages 
policy regime effects and actual treatment effects. 
31 Results are similar at the caseworker level; those are available upon 
request. 
32 The full sample population is observed for 42 months after unemployment 










individuals without employment. These zero observations are included in 
order to generate a comprehensive post-unemployment earnings measure 
that covers the intensive margin (earnings while employed) and the extensive 
margin (employment or not). The measure will be decomposed along these 
margins in Table 6. 
33 Our estimates assume that there is a linear relationship between outcomes 
and regimes. We have estimated alternative models that allow for a flexible 
functional form between outcomes and regimes. These models suggest a 
monotone relationship, and allowing for more flexibility does not improve the 
model fit at all. The linear model appears to provide an adequate description 
of the data. 
34 We also analysed non-employment duration. Results are similar for 
treatment effects and carrot regime effects. Stick regime effects for non-
employment duration are negative, while they are positive in the baseline 
analysis. This is consistent with our mixed evidence on stick regime effects on 
leaving the register, and on post-unemployment earnings. 
35 Our baseline earnings analyses, in Table 4, control for realized duration of 
unemployment showing the direct effect of regimes on earnings, but possibly 
miss an indirect effect of regimes on earnings through changes in 
unemployment duration. We have estimated models that omit unemployment 
duration as a regressor. Regime effects are not strongly affected by controls 
for unemployment duration (CW regime effects increase somewhat but 
remain small in quantitative terms). Treatment effects can not be identified 
since treatments are allocated throughout the unemployment spell introducing 
a mechanical link between treatment status and unemployment duration. 
36 These only concern the individuals observed to be employed after exit out 
of unemployment and hence exclude the small percentage of those with right-
censored unemployment durations. 
37 The difference between PES and caseworker effects on post-










two caseworker regime indicators display a substantially larger variance than 
the corresponding PES regime indicators. This may signify that the feasible 
range of PES regimes is smaller than that of caseworker regimes. In such a 
case a larger PES coefficient does not necessarily mean that caseworker 
effects are quantitatively less relevant, as any regime effect is the product of a 
coefficient and a change in the value of the corresponding indicator. 
Secondly, for employment effects the PES regime may be more relevant 
because total employment may include subsequent unemployment after job 
loss. If an employed individual expects an upcoming job loss then he may 
already contact the employment agency and register as soon-to-be 
unemployed. Such an individual is not necessarily intensively exposed to 
caseworkers, but one would expect that PES regime plays a role, especially 
since the individual has prior experience with the same PES regime. In 
contrast, the caseworker after subsequent reentry into unemployment is more 
likely to differ from the one in the spell of interest. 
38 Complementarity can be genuine or due to serial program attendance. Job 
seekers might be exposed both to carrot-type and to stick-type treatments, so 
increasing the intensity of the stick regime will affect outcomes in regions with 
high-intensity carrot regimes and vice versa. 
39 Our specification assumes that regime effects apply to treated and non-
treated job seekers alike. If the effect is just an ex ante effect for the first 
treatments then this is maybe too restrictive. However, recall that policy 
regimes are potentially more general than just ex ante effects. The policy 
regime does not become irrelevant after the first treatment, and it is an open 
question whether the intensity of the involvement of CW and PES increases 
over time or not. We have estimated models that allow for interaction effects. 
It turns out that we do not find that regime effects become less relevant after 
the first treatments. 
40 Dehejia (2005) discusses a related but different issue, namely what are the 
gains from asking the caseworker to decide on ALMP. He finds that a flexible 










41 This is due to the fact that the carrot and stick treatment effects are 
dominated by the so-called “lock-in” effect, see Table 5. The lock-in effect, the 
negative impact on the hazard, is larger for carrot treatments than for stick 
treatments. 
42 Restrictive policies promote unemployment exit only little. Recall that both 
supporting and restricting policies promote unemployment exit, and the effects 
are similar (Table 7). The restrictive experiment increases restricting 
programmes and reduces supporting programs generating, on net, small, or 
no, effects on unemployment exit. 
43 The average total duration of sanctions imposed on the additionally affected 
people (due to the strengthened stick regime) is about 14 work days. This 
amounts to 0.36 work days of additional benefit cut per person of the full 
sample. 
44 We use OLS regression here. We tested, as an alternative, to apply poisson 
regression. The ”goodness of fit” (as measured by the absolute distance 
between the prediction and the realization in the median intensity samples) 
was, however, not better for the latter. 
45 Figures for the years 2000 to 2005. Source: Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft 
SECO (2007): Arbeitslosigkeit in der Schweiz 2006, Bern, p.31. 
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